Chapter

Responsibility and psychopathy

John McMillan and Luca Malatesti

in Responsibility and psychopathy

Published on behalf of Oxford University Press

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199551637
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191754630 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199551637.003.0010

Series: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry

Responsibility and psychopathy

Show Summary Details

Preview

The previous chapters have described in some detail the cognitive, affective, and social deficits of those who score highly on Hare's psychopathy checklist. This section of the book considers what this implies about the moral responsibility of psychopaths. The chapters in this section discuss these issues from a variety of perspectives and while each chapter is self-contained, it is useful to sketch the general geography of the philosophical debate about psychopathy that is related to the ascription of moral responsibility.

We begin by saying why the moral responsibility of psychopaths is an important issue. Then, we consider the preconditions for moral responsibility. It will emerge that possessing moral understanding and being in control over one's actions are central preconditions that might be significant when considering the moral responsibility of psychopaths. Then, we discuss the points of convergence between the empirical work on psychopathy discussed in Section II of the book and these capacities.

Chapter.  5716 words. 

Subjects: Psychiatry

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.