Chapter

Normativity in the world

Julian C. Hughes

in Thinking Through Dementia

Published on behalf of Oxford University Press

Published in print February 2011 | ISBN: 9780199570669
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191754654 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199570669.003.0004

Series: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry

Normativity in the world

Show Summary Details

Preview

In this chapter, I have derived a transcendental account of the normativity of intentional psychological phenomena from Wittgenstein's rule-following discussion. It can be summarized thus: ♦ intentional psychological states are normative; ♦ normativity is a matter of being rule-governed; ♦ rules and rule-following involve practices and customs; ♦ practices and customs are embedded in the world.

I have then proceeded to discuss normativity and have accepted a quietist interpretation of the rule-following considerations, which stresses the givenness of normativity within an embedding human world. Normativity is seen as constitutive, immanent, and irreducible. The normativity of intentional psychological states involves an externalist construal of such states. In the chapters that follow, I shall apply this normative account of intentional psychological concepts to different models of dementia. Meanwhile, we have already glimpsed the extent to which an account of acquired diffuse neurocognitive dysfunction, which furnishes a sufficiently broad view, must have implications for our understanding of the person. The embedded nature of intentional mental states gestures in the direction of the situated, human-worldly context of persons.

Chapter.  19014 words. 

Subjects: Psychiatry

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.