Journal Article

Partial Belief, Partial Intention

Richard Holton

in Mind

Volume 117, issue 465, pages 27-58
Published in print January 2008 | ISSN: 0026-4423
Published online January 2008 | e-ISSN: 1460-2113 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn002
Partial Belief, Partial Intention

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  • Epistemology
  • Metaphysics
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Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential.

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Subjects: Epistemology ; Metaphysics ; Philosophy of Language ; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic ; Philosophy of Mind

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