Chapter

Caring, Implicit Attitudes, and the Self

Michael Brownstein

in The Implicit Mind

Published in print June 2018 | ISBN: 9780190633721
Published online April 2018 | e-ISBN: 9780190633752 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190633721.003.0004
Caring, Implicit Attitudes, and the Self

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Across both virtue and vice cases, spontaneity has the potential to give rise to actions that seem “unowned.” Agents may lack self-awareness, control, and reasons-responsiveness in paradigmatic cases. But these are actions nevertheless, in the sense that they are not mere happenings. While agents may be passive in an important sense when acting spontaneously, they are not thereby necessarily victims of forces acting upon them (from either “outside” or “inside” their own bodies and minds). The central claim of this chapter is that spontaneous actions can be, in central cases, “attributable” to agents, by which I mean that they reflect upon the character of those agents. This claim is made on the basis of a care-based theory of attributability. Attributability licenses (in principle) what some theorists call “aretaic” appraisals. These are evaluations of an action in light of an agent’s character or morally significant traits.

Keywords: self-awareness; control; reasons-responsiveness; attributability; aretaic appraisal; Huckleberry Finn; caring; deep self

Chapter.  11525 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind ; Philosophy

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