Article

A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?

Tomis Kapitan

in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780195178548
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.003.0006

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?

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This article, from a compatiblist viewpoint, argues that the Consequence Argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and develops criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. It first reviews various formulations of the Consequence Argument and the criticisms made against it over the past three decades. It then considers possible compatibilist strategies for answering the argument. It examines the Diodoran strategy and concludes that it fails to generate a valid closure rule of unavoidability that can justify the reasoning of the minimal inference pattern. Of the closure rules that are valid, either they cannot be mated to corresponding true premises, or they are unable to generate the desired conclusion from its premises.

Keywords: Consequence Argument; free will; power; ability; compatibilism; compatibilist approach; Diodoran strategy; closure rules

Article.  13385 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Metaphysics

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