Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism

Richard Double

in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780195178548
Published online September 2009 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism


This article defends a view called free will subjectivism. It shows how such a view and the free will problem in general are related to metaethical questions about the objectivity and subjectivity of value. It also considers how free will debates are influenced by differences in metaphilosophy—by differing views about the nature of philosophy. The article is organized as follows. The first part relates free will subjectivism to metaethical views about value, and argues that such a view best explains the persistent and seemingly irresolvable disagreements that have characterized debates about free will. The second part compares and contrasts free will subjectivism with those of other prominent contributors to contemporary free will debates, including B. F. Skinner, Daniel Dennett, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, P. F. Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Ted Honderich, and Peter Unger.

Keywords: free will; objectivity; subjectivity; value; metaethical views

Article.  9815 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Metaphysics

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