Article

Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions

Robert Audi

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0008

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions

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This article focuses on the cogito propositions and those propositions whose classification as a priori is disputed. It explains that a priori justification is commonly taken to be a kind of justification is based on reason rather than on experience and evaluates the skeptical view that no genuinely substantive proposition is a priori and that reason has far less power to reveal truth than has been supposed by a great many philosophers. It also discusses the domain of the a priori, empiricist skepticism about the a priori, and the case for a priori existential knowledge.

Keywords: cogito propositions; a priori justification; experience; reason; truth; empiricist skepticism; existential knowledge

Article.  13987 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology ; Philosophy of Mind

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