Article

Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism

Terence Cuneo

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0009

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism

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This article describes the relationship of skepticism with moral and quasi realism. It discusses the main reason why quasi realists believe that they can explain and justify the realist-seeming appearances of ordinary moral thought and discourse. It explains the distinction among the three different varieties of quasi realism and argues that none of them provide a more satisfactory job of explaining the acquisition of moral knowledge than robust realism. It concludes that some varieties of quasi realism fail to comport with platitudes central to our ordinary understanding of knowledge, while others do comport but fail to explain the acquisition of moral knowledge in a way that is more illuminating than robust realism.

Keywords: skepticism; moral realism; quasi realism; moral thought; moral knowledge; robust realism

Article.  12008 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Moral Philosophy ; Epistemology

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