Article

Moore and Skepticism

Noah Lemos

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191727474 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0016

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Moore and Skepticism

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This article examines philosopher G. E. Moore's thoughts and arguments against skepticism. It explains that Moore wrestled with issues of knowledge and skepticism throughout his career, examining and responding in several influential essays to various skeptical arguments. It describes Moore's response to one form of skeptical argument and contrasts it with two alternative approaches, relevantism and contextualism. It evaluates whether Moorean response to skepticism stifle epistemological inquiry and discusses Moore's denial that skepticism is epistemically possible in the sense that it is reasonable to believe that skepticism is true.

Keywords: G. E. Moore; skepticism; knowledge; relevantism; contextualism; epistemological inquiry

Article.  8618 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; History of Western Philosophy ; Epistemology

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