Article

Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0021

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology

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This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.

Keywords: antiluck epistemology; theories of knowledge; skepticism; closure principle

Article.  9700 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology

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