Article

Closure and Alternative Possibilities

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0022

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Closure and Alternative Possibilities

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This article examines the application of the closure principle in responding to skepticism. It discusses the nature of mathematical closure and its application in the context of contemporary epistemology and examines the dispute about the truth of closure principles in epistemology and the role alternative possibilities play in a proper understanding of the nature of knowledge. It also discusses the history of denials of closure and the defenses of closure in relevant-possibilities epistemology.

Keywords: closure principle; skepticism; truth; epistemology; alternative possibilities; relevant-possibilities epistemology

Article.  14215 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology

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