Disjunctivism and Skepticism

Alan Millar

in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780195183214
Published online September 2009 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Disjunctivism and Skepticism

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  • Epistemology
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This article considers the epistemological significance of disjunctivism and its bearing on philosophical skepticism. It explains that disjunctivism is a way of thinking about perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge and it is also the view that judgments that characterize how experience appears to a subject is as if things have disjunctive truth conditions. It discusses the relation of disjunctivism with the tradition of the conception of experience and the concept of recognitional abilities.

Keywords: disjunctivism; philosophical skepticism; perceptual experience; perceptual knowledge; truth conditions; recognitional abilities

Article.  12410 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology ; Philosophy of Mind

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