The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

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Keywords: concept; philosophers; nature; origin; scope; knowledge; sources; limits; analysis; skepticism

Book.  608 pages. 

Subjects: philosophy

Index Terms: a posteriori justification; a posteriori knowledge; a priori judgment; a priori justification; a priori knowledge; a priori proposition.; a priori truth; abstract entities; acceptance; access coherentism; access internalism; accessibility, cognitive; acquaintance; adequacy, criterion of; Alston, William; analytic epistemology; analytic philosophy; analyticity; analytic‐synthetic distinction; Anderson, Tony; Annis, David; Anselm; anti‐realism; apprehension of properties of objects; Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotle; Armstrong, David; assent; associationism; Audi, Robert; axioms; Ayer, A. J.; Bacon, Francis; Baier, Annette; basic belief; basic propositions; Bayesian conditionalization; Bayesianism; Bealer, George; beg the question; belief; Benacerraf, Paul; Bentham, Jeremy; Berkeley, George; biased sample, fallacy of; BonJour, Laurence; Brabeck, Mary; brain; Braine, David; Brandt, Richard; Brentano, Franz; Bromberger, Sylvain; Burge, Tyler; Buridan, Jean; Butchvarov, Panayot; Cantor, Georg; Carnap, Rudolph; Carneades; Cartesian demon; Castañeda, Hector Neri; causal responsibility; causal theory of justification; causal theory of knowledge; certainty; Chisholm, Roderick; Chomsky, Noam; circular reasoning; Clarke, Samuel; Clifford, William K; Clifford’s shipowner; closure principle; Code, Lorraine; cogency; cognitive science; cognitive virtues; Cohen, L. Jonathan; Cohen, Stewart; coherence; coherentism; common sense epistemology; competence; completeness concern, the; confidence; confirmation theory; conjunction rule of probability; consciousness; consistency; context; contextualism; contextually a priori; contingence; contingent proposition.; contingent truth; contrastive focus; Cornman, James; correspondence; Cosmides, Leda; Cowey, Fiona; criterial‐conceptual distinction; Dalmiya, Vrinda; Darwin, Charles; Davidson, Donald; Davidson’s swampman; Dawkins, Richard; decision theory; Deductive‐Nomological (D‐N) theory; defeasibility; defeater; defeating evidence; definitions; Dehaene, Stanislas; deliverances; Dennett, Daniel; Descartes, Rene; Dewey, John; diffusion; direct realist; dispositions; doxastic practice, a; doxastic voluntarism; Dretske, Fred; Duhem, Pierre; Durkheim, Emile; economic theory; EEG argument; eliminativism; Ellis, Brian; embodiment of knowers; emotions; emotivism; empirical investigation; empirical justification; empirical knowledge; empiricism; empiricist; epistemic achievement; epistemic attainment.; epistemic autonomy; epistemic circularity; epistemic closure; epistemic duty; epistemic goal; epistemic logic; epistemic overdetermination; epistemic responsibility; epistemic semantics; epistemic virtue; epistemicism; epistemological success; ethical cognitivism; ethical skepticism; ethics; evidence; evidence gathering; evidence paths; evidential underdetermination; evil demon hypothesis; evil genius hypothesis; evil, the problem of; Ewing, A. C.; experience; experiential evidence; experiential justification; explanation; Explanationism; explanatory inference; explanatory requirement, the; explanatory virtues; externalism; Fairweather, Abrol; feminist epistemology; Feuerbach, Ludwig; Fitch, Frederic; Fitch proof, the; Fodor, Jerry; Foley, Richard; foundationalism; freedom of speech; Frege, Gottlob; Freud, Sigmund; Galileo; gender; generality problem; Gettier, Edmund; Gettier counterexamples; Gettier problems; Gigerenzer, Gerd; Gilligan, Carol; Glymour, Clark; goal‐oriented belief; Gödel, Kurt; Goldman, Alvin I.; Goldman’s reliabilism; Goodman, Nelson; Goodman’s “grue” paradox; Grim, Patrick; Grünbaum, Adolf; Haack, Susan; habits of thought; Hacking, Ian; Hall, Richard J.; Harding, Sandra; Hare, Richard M.; Harman, Gilbert; Hartshorne, Charles; Hartsock, Nancy; Hasker, William; having justification for a belief vs. having justified belief; Hempel, Carl; Hilbert, David; Hilpinen, Risto; Hintikka, Jaakko; Hirschi, Travis; historicism; holism; Holmes, Justice; Hosiasson‐Lindenbaum, Janina; Hume, David; hypothetico‐deductivism; idealism; ideology; indications; indirect realist; induction, enumerative; inductive reasoning; inductivism; infallible belief; infallible justification; inference; inference rules, the skeptic’s; inference to the best explanation.; infinitism; innate; innateness; insufficient sample, fallacy of; intellectual responsibility; intellectual virtue; intentionality; internalism; introspection; introspective knowledge; intuition; intuitive reason; irrefutability; Jaggar, Alison; James, William; Jeffrey, Richard; Johnson, Charles R.; Jones, Karen; justification; justified belief; justified true belief; justifiedness; justifying a belief vs. a belief’s being justified; justifying evidence; Kahneman, Daniel; Kant, Immanuel; Kaplan, David; Keller, Evelyn Fox; Kim, Jaegwon; Kitcher, Philip; Klein, Peter; knower paradox, the; knowing; knowledge; Kohlberg, Lawrence; Kolmogorov axioms of probability; Kornblith, Hilary; Kripke, Saul; Kuhn, Thomas; Kuhnian underdetermination; language acquisition; Larned, Ann; Laudan, Larry; Lehrer, Keith; Leibniz, Gottfried; Lewis, David; liar paradox, the; Lipton, Peter; Little, Daniel; Locke, John; logic; logic of confirmation; logic of knowledge; logic of necessity; logical empiricism; logical positivism; Longino, Helen; Lycan, William; Mackie, J. L.; Maddy, Penelope; Maitzen, Stephen; Makinson, D. C.; Malcolm, Norman; maleness; Martin, C. B.; Marx, Karl; Marx’s theory of ideology; mathematical belief; mathematical definitions; mathematical knowledge; mathematical propositions; mathematical statements.; mathematical truth; mathematics; matters of fact, unobserved; Mavrodes, George I.; McGinn, Colin; Meinong, Alexius; memetics; memory; Meno; mental states; methodological solipsism; Mill, John Stuart; Milton, John; mind; minimal principle of contradiction; Mischel, Walter; misleading defeater; mixed theories of justification; modal knowledge; modal skepticism; modal status; Modus Ponens; Montague, Richard; Montmarquet, James; Moore, G. E.; moral certainty; moral epistemology; moral foundationalism; moral language; moral observation; moral philosophy; nativism; natural theology; naturalism; naturalistic epistemology; naturalized epistemology; ‘necessary’; necessary‐contingent distinction; necessary propositions.; necessary truths; necessity; Neurath, Otto; Newton, John; Nisbett, Richard; nonaccidentality; non‐basic propositions; nonexclusivity; nonnegligent belief; nonrivalry; normativity; Nozick, Robert; Nozickian tracking; numerical cognition; numerical knowledge; object‐relations theory; overriding defeater; Pappas, George; Park, Roger; Parsons, Charles; particularism; Pascal, Blaise; Pascal’s wager; Paxson, Thomas, Jr.; Peirce, Charles; perception; perceptual belief; phenomenalists; philosophical naturalism; Plantinga, Alvin; Plato; political theory; Popper, Karl; positivism; practical knowledge; pragmatic considerations; pragmatism; preferences; prescriptivism; probabilistic reasoning; probability, Komolgorov axioms of; probability theory; process reliabilism; proper basicality; proper functionalism; propositional knowledge; psychology; Putnam, Hilary; Pyrrho; Quine, W. V.; Quinton, Anthony; Radford, Colin; Railton, Peter; Ramsey, Frank; rational acceptance; rational belief; rational mechanism; rational revisability; rationalism; rationality; Rawls, John; realism; realism/instrumentalism controversy; reason; reasonability; reasonable belief; reasons for belief; recursion; Red Lion court; reflective equilibrium; reformed epistemology; regress; regress arguments for foundationalism; regress problem; Reichenbach, Hans; Reid, Thomas; relevant alternatives; reliabilism; reliabilist foundationalism; religion, philosophy of; religious diversity, the problem of; religious epistemology; replacement thesis; representationalist; representativeness heuristic; responsibility, causal; responsible belief; Ross, Lee; Ross, W. D.; Rousseau, Jean Jacques; Rowe, William; Russell, Bertrand; Russell’s paradox; Sacchiri, Gerolamo; salience; Schauer, Frederick; Scheler, Max; Scheman, Naomi; Schmitt, Frederick; Schopenhaur, Arthur; Schott, Robin May; science; scientific explanationism; scientific knowledge; scientific method; scientific naturalism; scientific propositions; Scriven, Michael; seemings; self‐deception; self‐knowledge; Sellars, Wilfrid; semantics, externalist accounts of; Semmelweis, Ignaz; Sextus Empiricus; Simon, Herbert; simplicity; situated knowledge; situationalism; skepticism; Smullyan, Raymond; social coherence theory; social empiricism; social epistemology; social psychology; sociology; solipsism, methodological; Solovay, R. M.; Sosa, Ernest; Stalnaker, Robert; standpoint theory; Stevenson, C. L.; Stich, Stephen; Sudbury, Aidan; sufficient reason, principle of; supervaluationism; supervenience; surprise test paradox, the; Swen, Blaine A.; Swinburne, Richard; symbiotic theory of knowing; synthetic apriori; testimony; Thagard, Paul; theoretical virtues; thought content, theory of; Tolliver, Joseph; Tooby, John; total evidence, requirement of; tracking; ‘true’; true belief; truth; truth‐conduciveness; truth‐valuational properties; truth value; Turing, Alan; Tversky, Amos; Tymoczko, Thomas; underdetermination; undermining defeater; undermining evidence; understanding; unexplainers; Unger, Peter; universality; vagueness; Van Cleve, James; Van Fraassen, Bas; virtue; virtue perspectivism; virtue theory; Vogel, Jonathan; Walker, L. J.; warrant; warranted belief; Whewell, William; White, Alan R.; Williamson, Timothy; wisdom; Wittgenstein, Ludwig; Wolterstorff, Nicholas; Wright, Crispin; Zagzebski, Linda

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