Article

Virtues in Epistemology

John Greco

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print October 2005 | ISBN: 9780195301700
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195301700.003.0010

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Virtues in Epistemology

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This article reviews some recent history of epistemology, focusing on ways in which the intellectual virtues have been invoked to solve specific epistemological problems. It gives a sense of the contemporary landscape that has emerged, and clarifies some of the disagreements among those who invoke the virtues in epistemology. Furthermore, it explores some epistemological problems in greater detail. It also defends a particular approach in virtue epistemology by displaying its power in addressing these problems. It pursues the idea that a minimalist, reliabilist notion of the intellectual virtues is useful for constructing an account of knowledge. It sets out to support this on the ground that this approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems in the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.

Keywords: epistemology; intellectual virtues; Humean skepticism; Gettier problem; knowledge

Article.  13031 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology ; Classical Philosophy

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