Decision Theory and Epistemology

Mark Kaplan

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print October 2005 | ISBN: 9780195301700
Published online September 2009 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Decision Theory and Epistemology

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This article finds it characteristic of orthodox Bayesians to hold that for each person and each hypothesis it comprehends, there is a precise degree of confidence that person has in the truth of that proposition, and that no person can be counted as rational unless the degree of confidence assignment it thus harbors satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus. In focusing exclusively on degrees of confidence, the Bayesian approach tells nothing about the epistemic status of the doxastic states epistemologists have traditionally been concerned about—categorical beliefs. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to show that, as powerful as many of such criticisms are against orthodox Bayesianism, there is a credible kind of Bayesianism. Second, it aims to show how this Bayesianism finds a foundation in considerations concerning rational preference.

Keywords: Bayesians; hypothesis; probability calculus; doxastic states; epistemologists

Article.  14487 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology ; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic ; Philosophy of Science

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