Article

Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered

Ignacio Jané

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

Published in print June 2007 | ISBN: 9780195325928
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0026

Series: Oxford Handbooks

Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered

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This article discusses canonical (i.e., full, or standard) second-order consequence and argues against it being a case of logical consequence. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first part comprises the first three sections. After stating the problem in Section 1, Sections 2 and 3 examine the role that the consequence relation is expected to play in axiomatic theories. This leads to put forward two requirements on logical consequence, which are called “formality” and “noninterference.” It is this last requirement that canonical second-order consequence violates, as the article sets out to substantiate. The fourth section argues that canonical second-order logic is inadequate for axiomatizing set theory, on the grounds that it codes a significant amount of set-theoretical content.

Keywords: higher-order logic; second-order consequence; logical consequence; axiomatic theories; formality; noninterference; set-theoretical content

Article.  13840 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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