Syndication of Vc Investments, Governance, and Contract Design

Azin Sharifzadeh and Uwe Walz

in The Oxford Handbook of Venture Capital

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780195391596
Published online September 2012 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks

Syndication of Vc Investments, Governance, and Contract Design


This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of syndication of venture capital (VC) investments, governance, and contract design based on evidence from the European venture capital market. The article is organized as follows. It first explores the potential consequences of different sources of funding on corporate governance, then discusses the approaches of different VC types to corporate governance. It examines the main motives and costs of syndication, and translates this reasoning into the implications of different syndicate structures on corporate governance and contract design. It then describes the data set and the descriptive statistics and considers the potential selection effects of different syndicates of portfolio firms. Finally, it investigates the impact of syndicate structures on contract design.

Keywords: European venture capital market; funding; corporate governance; syndication; syndicate structures

Article.  11388 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Financial Markets

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