Article

Venture Capital in Germany: The Role of Venture Capital Firms' Experience, Ownership Structure, and Agency Problems

Ron Christian Antonczyk, Wolfgang Breuer and Malte Brettel

in The Oxford Handbook of Venture Capital

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780195391596
Published online September 2012 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391596.013.0020

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Venture Capital in Germany: The Role of Venture Capital Firms' Experience, Ownership Structure, and Agency Problems

Show Summary Details

Preview

This article analyzes empirically the relevance of direct measures for incentive problems in German venture capital (VC) financial contracting, and investigates whether differences in experience or ownership structure across firms remain relevant even for given realizations of direct measures of incentive problems. It also asks whether risk perception in itself depends on experience and/or ownership structure. The article is organized as follows. It presents the database and describes the relative frequencies of several contractual terms in Germany and the role of debt financing as a determinant of the utilization of different covenants. It introduces independent variables and then analyzes how experience and ownership structure of a VC firm influence its utilization of contractual terms and its perception of incentive problems.

Keywords: incentive problems; German venture capital firms; financial contracting; ownership structure; risk perception; debt financing

Article.  10494 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Financial Markets

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.