Article

Informational Aspects of Conflict

Karl Wärneryd

in The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780195392777
Published online November 2012 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0002

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Informational Aspects of Conflict

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This article analyzes informational issues that emerge in a contest model of conflict, a model in which the outcome of open conflict depends on the relative military capabilities of the adversaries using a traditional Bayesian game-theoretic approach. It provides an introduction to the topic along with insights into how conflict can emerge in settings with informational asymmetries. The article deals with issues of asymmetric information about players' utility from winning; their costs of producing effort; abilities; and what private information about aggressive potential implies for the probability of outbreak of outright conflict instead of peaceful settlement.

Keywords: conflict model; Bayesian theory; informational asymmetries; game theory

Article.  7136 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Microeconomics ; Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General

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