Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism

David Widerker

in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

Second edition

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780195399691
Published online September 2012 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks

Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism


This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect the agent to have done something else. It argues that in situations of such kinds, agents can be held morally responsible for their actions, even in a libertarian sense. This views is called “Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.” It argues that this more “Frankfurt-friendly” view is another possible option open to libertarians in response to Frankfurt-type examples.

Keywords: Frankfurt-type examples; PAP; moral responsibility; libertarian; PAE

Article.  11407 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Metaphysics

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