Article

Consciousness in the World

Peter Poellner

in The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy

Published in print November 2007 | ISBN: 9780199234097
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234097.003.0013

Series: OXFORD HANDBOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY

 Consciousness in the World

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This article offers some detailed attention to a central, much-debated, indeed notorious, methodological technique of Husserl: the so-called phenomenological reduction. It primarily argues about substantive philosophical issues, with current debates in view. It briefly introduces the mature Husserl's philosophical project — the putatively foundational, ‘transcendental’ explication of the constitutive conditions of a subject's being able to represent a world at all — and Husserl's fundamental methodological principle — the idea that the claims of phenomenology are to be based on what is ‘self-given’ in experience. It also addresses and defends the most controversial, and most often misinterpreted, aspects of Husserl's phenomenological approach: the suspension of ‘theory’. In the concluding section, this article offers some brief reflections on how Husserl's phenomenological externalist realism relates to stronger, metaphysical claims.

Keywords: Husserl; phenomenological reduction; philosophical issues; externalist realism; metaphysical claims

Article.  23405 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Epistemology ; Philosophy of Mind

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