Article

The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life

Matthew Ratcliffe

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion

Published in print December 2009 | ISBN: 9780199235018
Published online January 2010 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0016

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life

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This article describes the phenomenological role of deep moods, and goes on to consider their nature. It argues that we experience the world through our feeling bodies, and that distinctions between internally directed bodily feelings and externally directed intentional states should be rejected. It distinguishes between intentional and pre-intentional feelings, suggesting that most of those phenomena referred to as “emotions” are comprised at least partly of the former, whereas those moods that constitute the experienced meaningfulness of the world consist entirely of pre-intentional feeling.

Keywords: phenomenology; feeling bodies; intentional states; pre-intentional feelings; experienced meaningfulness; meaning of life

Article.  11275 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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