Saying It

David Pugmire

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion

Published in print December 2009 | ISBN: 9780199235018
Published online January 2010 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Saying It

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The awareness of something for its inferential relations requires focus on its generality, as distinct from its individuality (Socrates is a man and mortal). But if need be, the latter can often be categorized into the former reasonably innocuously. Thus, non-conceptualized experience is not the same as non-conceptualizable experience. It is normally possible to articulate “whole” experiences conceptually if need be. But it is suggested that an experience might be unconceptualizable at least temporarily if its contents were sufficiently novel or exotic (as in Crane's example of a child's first sighting of a cathode ray tube), where one's grasp at the time did not extend much beyond “that thing”. It would not (yet) elicit a wider field of inferential commitments.

Keywords: inferential relations; non-conceptualized experience; inferential commitments; ineffability; reticence; giving voice

Article.  5670 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language

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