Article

Physician Agency and Payment for Primary Medical Care

Thomas G. McGuire

in The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics

Published in print April 2011 | ISBN: 9780199238828
Published online September 2012 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238828.013.0025

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Economics

 Physician Agency and Payment for Primary Medical Care

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  • Health, Education, and Welfare
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The purpose of this article is to consider the implications of the theoretical and empirical literature on physician behavior and the payment for the design of a payment system to finance a medical home. It states that an analysis of physician behavior implies primary care physicians should be paid by a combination of an enrollment-based prospective payment, and fees related to procedures. As in many areas of health economics designing such a system involves issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. This article is concerned with the moral hazard component: designing a payment system to convey appropriate incentives to supply care. It makes some preliminary comments on the implications for dealing with selection in the upfront enrollment payment associated with the medical home.

Keywords: payment system; primary care; health economics; physician behavior; medical home

Article.  10209 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Public Economics

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