Article

Panpsychism

William Seager

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0012

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Panpsychism

Preview

Panpsychism endorses the co-fundamental status of matter and mind in so far as it allows there are features of the world which are non-mental. Panpsychism is also not generally a view in which mentality is taken as ‘substantial’. It is more natural to regard panpsychism as expressing the view that, roughly speaking, everything exemplifies certain mental properties. However, it is an important and distinctive claim of many panpsychists that the ‘object/property’ metaphysics we take for granted is fundamentally mistaken and must be replaced with another metaphysical vision of the basic structure of reality.

Keywords: panpsychism; status of matter; status of mind; mental properties; metaphysics; structure of reality

Article.  6995 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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