Article

Representationalist Theories of Consciousness

Michael Tye

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0015

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Representationalist Theories of Consciousness

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This article surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The article is divided into five sections. The first section offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. The second section presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. The third section canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. The fourth section lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections.

Keywords: representationalist theories; theories of phenomenal consciousness; phenomenal consciousness; representationalism; mental state; character of experiences

Article.  7335 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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