Article

Phenomenal Concepts

Katalin Balog

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0018

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Phenomenal Concepts

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This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience. These are called ‘phenomenal concepts’ (PCs) and they are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experiences strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia.

Keywords: phenomenal concepts; phenomenal experiences; qualitative character; metaphysical status; qualia; epistemic access

Article.  10226 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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