Article

A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes

Robert J. Matthews

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0025

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes

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The chief virtue of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes, besides getting right the semantic nature of attitude predicates, is precisely that, as Davidson suggests, it enables one to embrace the very plausible relational conception of attitude attributions without thereby having to embrace the much more dubious relational conception of the attitudes themselves. To be a non-relationalist about the attitudes one does not, as Quine, Fodor, and others have assumed, have to be a non-relationalist about attitude predicates. It is entirely possible that propositional attitudes are monadic properties of their possessors, even though they are predicated of individuals by means of relational predicates.

Keywords: attitudes; relational conception; attitude predicates; propositional attitudes; monadic properties; relational predicates

Article.  6004 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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