Article

The Normativity of the Intentional

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0026

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 The Normativity of the Intentional

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Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) The first two sections of this article give a brief clarification of what this claim that ‘the intentional is normative’ actually means. The third section considers a number of arguments that philosophers have advanced in favour of this claim; as the discussion reflects, many of these arguments are inconclusive at best. However, the last section gives a sketch of a different argument, which the author regards as a persuasive argument for this claim.

Keywords: philosophy of mind; normativity; philosophy of language; meaning; intentional; persuasive argument

Article.  8264 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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