Article

Self‐Deception

Kent Bach

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199262618
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0046

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Self‐Deception

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Is self-deception really a matter of deliberately getting oneself to believe something contrary to something else one already believes and, if so, how can one succeed at it? Colloquial phrases for it, like ‘fooling yourself’ and ‘lying to yourself’, evoke paradox. Although this article stresses the more recent philosophical work on the subject, most work on self-deception has focused on this paradox and sought ways to clear the air of it. The article focuses on the puzzles and questions of contemporary philosophical interest.

Keywords: self-deception; contemporary philosophy; irrationality; lying model; epistemic support; intentional action

Article.  7318 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Moral Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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