Article

Mental Causation

Cei Maslen, Terry Horgan and Helen Daly

in The Oxford Handbook of Causation

Published in print November 2009 | ISBN: 9780199279739
Published online January 2010 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0025

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

 Mental Causation

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Philosophy
  • Metaphysics
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Philosophy of Science

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

Mental causation is held so dear because it seems essential in order for people to do anything (at least voluntarily). If one accepts Davidson's view that motivating reasons are causes, then (as Kim puts it) ‘agency is possible only if mental causation is possible’. Many kinds of mental items are supposed to be causes: beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, the contents of beliefs and desires, and the phenomenal mental properties of sensations and beliefs (i.e. those properties such that there is ‘something it is like’ to experience them, if sensations and beliefs have such properties). Not only are mental states supposed to be causes (and effects), but so also are mental properties.

Keywords: mental causation; sensations; emotions; contents of beliefs; mental properties; mental states

Article.  14685 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Metaphysics ; Philosophy of Mind ; Philosophy of Science

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.