Structure and Coherence in the Political Economy of Public Finance

Stanley L. Winer and Walter Hettich

in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Published in print June 2008 | ISBN: 9780199548477
Published online September 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191577437 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks of Political Science

Structure and Coherence in the Political Economy of Public Finance

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The article provides an outline of the economics of the public sector and of its structure when collective choice is regarded as an essential component of the analysis. It identifies the key issues that must be faced by political scientists and economists who insist that collective institutions cannot be ignored in research on taxation and public budgets. It also reviews various alternatives to the median voter model; these alternatives are frameworks that interpret public policies as equilibrium outcomes in a multidimensional setting.

Keywords: public sector; economics structure; collective choice; framework of analysis; key issues; collective institutions; taxation; public budgets; median voter model; public policies

Article.  10401 words. 

Subjects: Political Economy ; Political Institutions

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