Article

Electoral Systems and Economic Policy

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Published in print June 2008 | ISBN: 9780199548477
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0040

Series: Oxford Handbooks of Political Science

Electoral Systems and Economic Policy

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This article discusses recent empirical and theoretical research on the electoral rule, which is one feature of modern democracies. It determines that the electoral rule systematically shapes economic policy. An outline of some key objectives of electoral rules is presented in the first section; it further notes the stability and systematic selection that characterize real-world constitutions. It then introduces the main concepts that categorize different electoral rules, and explains how these elements help shape the accountability of government and the size of political rents and corruption. Finally, the article deals with representation in government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.

Keywords: electoral rule; recent research; modern democracies; economic policy; key objectives; representation; fiscal policy choices

Article.  6990 words. 

Subjects: Politics ; Comparative Politics ; Political Economy

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