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This article discusses recent empirical and theoretical research on the electoral rule, which is one feature of modern democracies. It determines that the electoral rule systematically shapes economic policy. An outline of some key objectives of electoral rules is presented in the first section; it further notes the stability and systematic selection that characterize real-world constitutions. It then introduces the main concepts that categorize different electoral rules, and explains how these elements help shape the accountability of government and the size of political rents and corruption. Finally, the article deals with representation in government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.
Keywords: electoral rule; recent research; modern democracies; economic policy; key objectives; representation; fiscal policy choices
Article. 6960 words.
Subjects: Comparative Politics ; Political Economy
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