Article

Rule‐Following, Meaning, and Normativity

George M. Wilson

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199552238
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0007

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Rule‐Following, Meaning, and Normativity

Preview

This article starts out by delineating an interpretation of Kripke on Wittgenstein, an interpretation that seems to stand the best chance of fitting at least the basic concerns and insights expressed in the Investigations. In doing so, this article sketches a conception of meaning and truth conditions against which Wittgenstein's remarks are plausibly directed, and it explains how Kripke's reconstruction of Wittgenstein can be read as incorporating a broad attack on that conception. The interpretation with which the article opens offers what the article calls ‘the (merely) dramatic reading of the Skeptical Argument.’

Keywords: rule-following; meaning; normativity; Wittgenstein; skeptical argument; skeptical solution

Article.  13302 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language

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