Article

Propositional Content

Stephen Schiffer

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199552238
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0013

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Propositional Content

Preview

Two philosophers may accept the face-value theory and therefore agree that the things we believe are propositions — abstract, mind- and language-independent entities that have truth conditions, and have their truth conditions both essentially and absolutely — but disagree about the further nature of those propositions. This article presents a brief critical survey of some of the options. There are problems with the Russellian face-value theory of belief reports. These problems were first clearly stated in Frege's ‘On Sense and Reference,’ published in 1892, where he renounced the Russellian face-value theory he formerly held and supplanted it with a theory examined in this chapter.

Keywords: face-value theory; abstract; language-independent entities; mind-independent entities; truth conditions; belief reports; sense and reference

Article.  13540 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribeRecommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »