Article

Deflationism

Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199552238
Published online September 2009 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0025

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Deflationism

Preview

There is a core metaphysical claim shared by all deflationists: truth is not a genuine, substantive property. But anyone who denies that truth is a genuine property must still make sense of our pervasive truth talk. In addressing questions about the meaning and function of ‘true’, deflationists engage in a linguistic or semantic project, a project that typically goes hand-in-hand with a deflationary account of the concept of truth. A thoroughgoing deflationary account of truth will go beyond the negative metaphysical claim about truth and the positive linguistic account of the word ‘true’: it will also maintain that the concept of truth is a ‘thin’ concept that bears no substantive conceptual connections to other concepts to which it is traditionally tied.

Keywords: deflationism; metaphysical claim; truth talk; concept of truth; conceptual connections; substantive property

Article.  12095 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language

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