Article

Intentionality without representationalism

John J. Drummond

in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199594900
Published online January 2013 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0007

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Intentionality without representationalism

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This chapter addresses the issues that motivate representationalist accounts, and it describes the different versions of representationalism as responses to these issues. It argues that the representationalist views do not adequately respond to the epistemological problems that motivate them and that they engender some ontological problems. The chapter presents an alternative ‘presentationalist’ account that preserves the straightforward sense of the mind's openness to the world. While representationalism and presentationalism agree that the relation between mental events or states is direct but mediated, they radically differ in their views of the nature of the mediation involved in the mind's intentional directedness to the world. This difference and the preferability of the presentationalist account are explored.

Keywords: representationalism; presentationalism; mediation; conception-dependence; existence-independence; philosophy of logic; language; mental events; illusion; hallucination

Article.  10073 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind

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