Article

Self-consciousness and World-consciousness

Dorothée Legrand

in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology

Published in print December 2012 | ISBN: 9780199594900
Published online January 2013 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0015

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Self-consciousness and World-consciousness

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Is self-consciousness intentional? Consciousness of oneself-as-object is, in the sense that the subject is there taken as its own object of intentional consciousness. Contrastively, it has been argued that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is not intentional, precisely in that it does not involve taking oneself as an intentional object. Here, it is rather proposed that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is tied to intentionality in that it involves being conscious of oneself as an intentional subject, i.e. as a subject directed at intentional objects transcending oneself-as-subject. This form of self-consciousness is neither reflective, in the sense that it does not involve to take oneself as an object of reflection, nor reflexive, in the sense that it does not involve to be related to oneself but to what-one-is-not, i.e. to the transcending intentional object. It is further argued that consciousness of oneself-as-subject involves two dynamics, as the subject would be indicated to himself by the objects towards which he directs himself. These considerations are here unfolded to consider in particular bodily self-consciousness.

Keywords: self-consciousness; oneself-as-subject; bodily subjectivity; reflectivity; reflexivity; intentionality

Article.  8540 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mind ; Epistemology

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