Article

Models of Coalition Formation in Multilateral Negotiations

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Kalyan Chatterjee

in The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199730858
Published online December 2012 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199730858.013.0007

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Models of Coalition Formation in Multilateral Negotiations

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This article discusses the models of multiparty bargaining and determines the impact of who speaks to whom and when on bargaining outcomes. It also describes some recent models of coalition formation, identifying the predictions they generate (and how they could be tested in future empirical work), highlighting their assumptions (and how they could be relaxed in future theoretical work). There are incentives for parties to form coalitions before an election to prevent a minority group from winning. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Sjostrom identified a number of variables that affect pre-electoral coalition formation. Models of coalition bargaining have the potential to give testable predictions in multilateral bargaining settings and to help better understand a variety of real-world bargaining settings.

Keywords: multiparty bargaining; bargaining outcomes; coalition formation; election; incentives; models

Article.  5799 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Microeconomics ; Econometrics and Mathematical Economics

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