Bargaining and Negotiations

Werner Güth

in The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199730858
Published online December 2012 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Bargaining and Negotiations

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Economics
  • Microeconomics
  • Econometrics and Mathematical Economics


Show Summary Details


This article argues for the need for improved models of cognitive limitations of bargainers in order to explain and predict outcomes. It became clear early that when designing institutions of bargaining and negotiation there will be two directions, namely one based on the assumption of rationality and one based on empirical findings. Teaching and learning bargaining behavior and better negotiation techniques requires a reliance on mental models and such concepts as success aspirations and satisficing in search. Some new and innovative experimental paradigms are suggested, such as employing bribery games when exploring the behavior of public administrators or inspector games when investigating monitoring in firms and other organizations. The present boom of experimental economics might show a bubble that can collapse when overly optimistic expectations concerning how much can be learned within a short time are not fulfilled.

Keywords: bargaining; negotiation; mental models; bribery games; experimental economics; public administrators; inspector games

Article.  4791 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Microeconomics ; Econometrics and Mathematical Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.