Heterogeneity in Ultimatum Bargaining

Angela C. M. de Oliveira and Catherine C. Eckel

in The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199730858
Published online December 2012 | | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks

 Heterogeneity in Ultimatum Bargaining

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  • Economics
  • Microeconomics
  • Econometrics and Mathematical Economics


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This article addresses the personality differences that enable help in predicting negotiated outcomes. It specifically describes the recent advances in ultimatum game (UG) results on three fronts: the effects of the information available to proposers and responders, the stable characteristics of each, and the state of mind they are in when making their decisions. Behavior can differ greatly by society but the distinctions actually depend on a much finer scale than the broad regional differences. It is found that individuals who are less likely to view a low offer as a threat have lower minimum acceptable offers. It is vital for negotiators to know the norms of the context in which they are bargaining to achieve the best possible outcomes. Rejections tend to occur when people are more likely to be offended by low offers or when it is an affront to their sense of self.

Keywords: ultimatum game; decisions; minimum acceptable offer; negotiators; bargaining; rejections; proposers; responders

Article.  8166 words. 

Subjects: Economics ; Microeconomics ; Econometrics and Mathematical Economics

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