Article

The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

in The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz

ISBN: 9780199744725
Published online January 2013 | | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199744725.013.002
The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles

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This article discusses three fundamental principles of Leibniz's philosophy: the Principle of Contradiction, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. The article discusses various formulations of these principles, their axiomatic character, and some attempts to demonstrate them. In particular, the article discusses in detail the derivation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Primary Truths, and it argues that Leibniz does not use the Principle of Contradiction in that derivation. It also discusses an attempt, in the correspondence with Clarke, to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason empirically. Finally, the article examines the argument for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles in the Discourse.

Keywords: Leibniz; Principle of Contradiction; Principle of Sufficient Reason; Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles

Article.  10670 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy ; History of Western Philosophy ; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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