Journal Article

Knowledge, Beliefs, and Game‐Theoretic Solution Concepts

Oliver Board

in Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Published on behalf of The Oxford Review of Economic Policy Ltd

Volume 18, issue 4, pages 418-432
Published in print December 2002 | ISSN: 0266-903X
Published online December 2002 | e-ISSN: 1460-2121 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/18.4.418
Knowledge, Beliefs, and Game‐Theoretic Solution Concepts

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  • Economic Development and Growth
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In situations of strategic interaction it is important for agents to consider not only what their rivals will do, but also what they know, what they know about what they know, and so on. Formal models of knowledge have been developed to help us keep track of these levels of knowledge. This paper provides a non‐technical introduction to one of these models, and investigates its foundations. It is then shown how the model can be used to analyse game‐theoretic solution concepts, in particular Nash equilibrium.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth ; Public Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Policy

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