Journal Article

Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic‐mail Game

Stephen Morris

in Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Published on behalf of The Oxford Review of Economic Policy Ltd

Volume 18, issue 4, pages 433-445
Published in print December 2002 | ISSN: 0266-903X
Published online December 2002 | e-ISSN: 1460-2121 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/18.4.433
Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic‐mail Game

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Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common‐knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic‐mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.

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Subjects: Economic Development and Growth ; Public Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Policy

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