Journal Article

Evolution of Preferences

Eddie Dekel, Jeffrey C. Ely and Okan Yilankaya

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 74, issue 3, pages 685-704
Published in print July 2007 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 2007 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/74.3.685
Evolution of Preferences

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We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may observe the opponents' preferences perfectly, not at all, or with some in-between probability. When preferences are observable, a stable outcome must be efficient. When they are not observable, a stable outcome must be a Nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable. We show that, for pure-strategy outcomes, these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect, and almost no, observability, with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability (despite being stable with no observability).

Keywords: C72; C73

Journal Article.  11436 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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