Journal Article

The War of Information

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 79, issue 2, pages 707-734
Published in print April 2012 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online March 2012 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds017
The War of Information

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  • Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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We analyse political contests (campaigns) between two parties with opposing interests. Parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit. Parties' actions are strategic substitutes: increasing one party's cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information. For voters, parties' actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party's cost may be beneficial. Asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party's decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information.

Keywords: Political competition; Campaign spending; D72

Journal Article.  12516 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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