Journal Article

Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies

Philip Keefer

in The World Bank Economic Review

Volume 22, issue 1, pages 33-61
Published in print February 2008 | ISSN: 0258-6770
Published online January 2008 | e-ISSN: 1564-698X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhm019
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies

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The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict.

Keywords: D73; D74

Journal Article.  11990 words. 

Subjects: Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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