Journal Article

Judicial Reform

Juan Carlos Botero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Alexander Volokh

in The World Bank Research Observer

Published on behalf of World Bank

Volume 18, issue 1, pages 61-88
Published in print March 2003 | ISSN: 0257-3032
Published online March 2003 | e-ISSN: 1564-6971 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkg005
Judicial Reform

Show Summary Details

Preview

A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive‐oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Development Planning and Policy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.