Journal Article

Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 71, issue 1, pages 165-191
Published in print January 2004 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2004 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00280
Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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  • Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy
  • Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting. Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A “good” voting rule must give incentives to acquire information, as well as aggregate information efficiently. A voting rule that requires a large plurality (in the extreme, unanimity) to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each agent is sufficiently accurate. This result is independent of the preferences of voters and of the cost of information.

Keywords: D71; D83

Journal Article.  14359 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy ; Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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