Journal Article

Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

David Strömberg

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 71, issue 1, pages 265-284
Published in print January 2004 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2004 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00284
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Services
  • Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
  • Analysis of Collective Decision-making

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters.

Keywords: D72; L11; L82

Journal Article.  10047 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Services ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; Analysis of Collective Decision-making

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.